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THE COMPULSORY DUPLICATION OF STOCK
CERTIFICATES.
§ I. INTRODUCTORY.
Whenever two certificates are issued by a corporation
representing the same shares of stock, the legal situations
which may arise are varied, complicated, and interesting. If
the two certificates are in the hands of different owners, one of
three parties must suffer. One or the other of the certificate-
holders must lose the stock ; and the loser must either bear.
his loss, or throw it upon the corporation if he can. Before.
proceeding to the consideration of our particular subject,.
therefore, it will be well to consider briefly some of the gen-.
eral principles governing the issue of stock-certificates and
the transfer of stock.
i. The registered owner of stock can be deprived of his
title to such stock only by his own act,' or by some legal
proceeding quasi in rem.'
2. There are two essential factors in the transfer of the
legal title to stock. One is the transfer of.rae interest of the
registered owner in accordance with the preceding rule; the
' Colonial Bank v. Cady, r5 A. C. 267 (189o) ; Telegraph Co. v. Daven-
port, 97 U. S. 643 (1878).
2 Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U. S. 193 (1877) ; Chapman v. Phcenix Nat.
Bank, 85 N. Y. 437 (i88z).
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other is the recognition of this transfer by the corporation.
When both of these take place the legal title to the stock is
transferred.' This principle seems to have been overlooked
in Telford Turnpike Co. v. Gerhab.2 In that case A., the
registered owner of stock transferred his certificate to B. The
corporation had notice of the transfer, which, however, was
not recorded. Subsequently the stock was attached by a
creditor of A.'s and sold to C. at the execution sale, C. having
notice of the prior transfer to B. The corporation recognized
C. as the owner of the stock. In an action for damages
brought by B. against the corporation, the court held that B.
could not recover the value of the stock, but only for the
damage he had sustained by reason of the defendant's refusal
to recognize the transfer to him; on the ground that no title
to the stock had passed to C. Now, while B. clearly had
the superior equitable right to the stock, and could enforce
his claims against both C. and the corporation, it seems that
C. had acquired the legal title to the stock by virtue of the
act of the corporation in recognizing the execution sale as
transferring A.'s interest in the stock. Suppose that C. had
sold his certificate to D., a purchaser without notice of B.'s
claim, would not D.'s title to the stock have been superior
to C.'s ?
3. The transfer of the stock certificate by indorsement and
delivery operates as a complete equitable assignment of the
stock.3  Since the assignment is complete, equity will enforce it
even in favor of a volunteer,4 whereas an incomplete assign-
ment is unenforceable unless the assignee has given value.5
There is much confusion in the books in the use of the terms
"legal title" and "equitable title" with reference to stock It
is often said, for example, that the legal title passes as between
the parties by the indorsement and delivery of the certificate.
'New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30 (I865);
London v. Prov. Tel. Co., L. R. 9 Eq. 653 (1870) -
2 13 AUt. 9o (1888).
3 Black v. Zacharie, 3 How. 482 (1845).
4 Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Co., 76 N. Y. 365 (1879).
5 This distinction is clearly pointed out in Harding v. Harding, 17
P. B. D. 442 (1886).
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Force is given to this statement by the fact that the assignee
of the certificate is often allowed legal remedies to enforce his
rights. Thus, it is often held that the assignee of the certificate
may sue the corporation for conversion of the stock if it fails
to recognize his right to the stock; and in some jurisdictions
mandamus will lie against the corporation to compel a recog-
nition of the transfer. The existence of legal remedies, how-
ever, while it gives rise to many anomalies, does not change
the essential character of an equitable right. The legal title
to stock is acquired only when the corporation recognizes the
transfer.' Some of the American decisions, it is true, establish
a different rule in regard to the priority of equitable interests
in stock from that which is upheld in England,' but such
decisions do not and cannot affect the essential requisites of
transfer of the legal title.
4. The issue of a stock-certificate amounts to an affirma-
tion on the part of the corporation that the person named
therein is the legal owner of the stock. This affirmation
works an estoppel against the corporation in favor of one who
acts in reliance upon it This affirmation will be enforced
specifically if possible ; but if specific performance is impos-
sible, as where the certificate represents an over-issue, the
party claiming the benefit of the estoppel is entitled to dam-
ages for the false representation This principle is too well
established to be questioned; yet in a single instance our
courts have either overlooked it or refused to apply it. In
Dewing v. Perdicaries,' stock in a South Carolina corporation
belonging to loyal owners was sequestrafed by judicial pro-
ceedings taken in the Confederate District Court in accordance
with .a statute of the Confederate States. The sequestrated
IShropshire Union Canal Co. v. Queen, L. R. 7 H. L. 496 (1875);
Winter v. Belmont Mining Co., 53 Cal. 428 (1879) ; Soci t G6nrale de
Paris v. Walker, ii A. C. 20 (1885) ; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. V.
Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 3o (1865).
2 Winter v. Montgomery Gas Light Co., 89 Ala. 544, 7 S. 773 (1890).
3Simm v. Anglo-Amer. Tel. Co., 5 Q. B. D. 188 (1879); Mandlebaum
v. North Amer. Min. Co., 4 Mich. 465 (1857).
' Barkinshaw v. Nicolls, 3 A. C. 1004 (1878).
5New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, supra; In re Bahia & S.
F. Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 584 (i868).
696 U. S. 193 (1877) ; Central R. Co. v. Ward, 37 Ga. si5 (i868).
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stock was sold, and the corporation was compelled by the
Confederate authorities to issue stock certificates to the pur-
chasers. The Supreme Court held that the order of seques-
tration, the sale, the transfer, and the new certificates were
void, and did not affect the rights of the loyal owners of the
stock. The court also held that the transferees of the new
certificates, although bona fide purchasers for value, could
acquire no right of indemnity against the corporation. The
reason given for this holding is that the transferee of the cer-
tificate can acquire no greater rights than his transferor pos-
sessed. The court seems to overlook the fact that the right
of a bona fide purchaser of a void certificate against the cor-
poration is not a derivative right, acquired by assignment from
his transferror, but an independent right, personal to himself,
and resulting from his having acted in reliance on the repre-
sentation of the corporation contained in the certificate. The
decision in question seems to have been influenced rather by
patriotic than by legal reasoning.
5. Inasmuch as the transfer of the certificate by indorsement
and delivery operates as a complete equitable assignment of the
stock, the corporation acts at its peril in recognizing a transfer
and issuing a new certificate when the old is not surrendered.
It is, therefore, liable in damages to one who purchases the
original certificate for value and without notice,1 unless it can
show that the holder of the new certificate has a better title to
the stock than the holder of the original certificate.
2
6. Ordinarily, the corporation is not bound to issue a new
'Bridgeport Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 30 Conn. 231 (1861);
Socit( G(ndrale de Paris v. Walker, ii A. C. 20 (1885), per Lord
Selborne; Bank v. Lanier, ii Wall. 369 (1870); New York, N. Y. &
H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30 (T865); Strange v. H. & T. C. Ry.
Co., 53 Tex. 162 (188o); Hazard v. National Exchange Bank, 26 F. 94
(1886) ; Sargent v. Essex Marine Co., 9 Pick. 201 (1829); Factors' and
Traders' Ins. Co. v. Marine Dry Dock Co., 31 La. Ann. 149 (1879); De
Comean v. Guild Farm Oil Co., 3 Daly, 218 (1870); Smith v. American
Coal Co., 7 Lans. 317 (T873); Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Co., 76 N. Y.
365 (1879) ; Keller v. Eureka Brick Co., 43 Mo. App. 84 (I89o ) ; Balkis
Consol. Co. v. Tomkinson (1893) A. C. 396.
2Sprague v. Cocheco Mfg. Co., io Blatchf. 172 (1872) ; Fisher v. Essex
Bank, 5 Gray, 373 (1855); Princeton Bank v. Crozer, 22 N. J. L. 383
(185o) ; Nagleev. Pacific Wharf Co., 20 Cal. 529 (1862) ; Blanchard v. Ded-
ham Gas Light Co., 12 Gray, 213 (1858); Young v. So. Tredegar Iron
Co., T Pickle, 189, 2 S. W, 202 (i886), semble.
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certificate for stock unless the old is surrendered. In certain
cases, however, the law requires the issue of a new certificate
without the cancellation of the old. If the rule stated in the
last paragraph be correct, the law should not compel the issue
of a new certificate in such cases unless the rights of the holder
of the new certificate are made paramount to those of the
holder of the original. To require the corporation to issue a
new certificate without requiring the surrender of the old, and
without making the rights of the holder of the new certificate
paramount, is to compel the corporation to incur a possible
liability to the holder of the original certificate, a result which
is manifestly unjust to the corporation. Yet there are two
classes of cases in which the law thus ignores the rights of
the corporation. It need hardly be said that such law is the
result of legislative, not of judicial action. In the first class
of cases the law requires the issue of a new certificate to one
who claims the stock, not by virtue of a voluntary transfer: by
the owner, but as the result of a judicial seizure of the stock.
In the second class of cases the new certificate must be issued
to replace an original supposed to be lost or destroyed.
§ 2. COMPULSORY DUPLICATION OF CERTIFICATES IN CON-
SEQUENCE OF JUDICIAL SEIZURE OF STOCK.
The seizure of stock by legal process is purely a matter of
statute. Two theories exist as to the nature of such seizure.
According to the first theory, which prevails almost every-
where, stock is seized by a proceeding quasi in rem brought
against the owner personally, and against the stock by giving
notice in some form to the corporation at its domicile.
According to the second theory, stock may be seized by
seizing the certificates of stock in the hands of the holder.
I. SEIZURE OF STOCK AT THE DOMICILE OF THE CORPORATION.
The methods of seizure provided by statute in various juris-
dictions are numerous. The following methods are more or
less common: Attachment, execution, involuntary bankruptcy,
garnishment of the corporation, seizure for taxes, confisca-
tion, charging orders on the stock, and statutory equitable
proceedings quasi in rem. It is not the purpose of this article
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to discuss these methods in detail, but simply to point out the
effect upon the corporation of the duplication of certificates
in consequence of such proceedings. For it is almost uni-
versally held that the person claiming title to the stock in
consequence of such seizure is entitled to a new certificate of
stock; and of course he is unable to surrender the old cer-
tificate, which is not in his possession or control. The deter-
mination of the liability of the corporation in these cases is a
simple matter if we bear in mind the rule given in § I, par. 5.
The test of such liability to a purchaser of the original certifi-
cate for value and without notice is the.relation between the
rights of such purchaser and those of the holder of the new
certificate. Disregarding, therefore, the manifold differences
in statutes and statutory construction, our attention will be
confined to the examination of the different rules which have
been applied to determine the respective merits of the claims
of the holders of the two certificates.
(a.) -When the seizure of the stock by process directed
against the interest of the registered owner takes place, no
subsequent transfer of the original certificate by the owner
can confer any right upon the transferee as against the cor-
poration or the party claiming under the seizure.
(b.) In the following cases the rights of the transferee for value
before the seizure have been held superior to those of the party
claiming under the seizure.2 This rule does not protect a
'Sprague v. Cocheco Mfg. Co., io Blatchf. 172 (1872); Wilson v.
Atlantic, etc., Ry. Co., 2 F. 459 (i88o); Kentucky Nat. Bank v. Avery,
12 Nat. Corp. Rep. iii, Ky. C. C. (1896); Harris v. Bank, 5 La. Ann. 538
I85O); Morehead v. Western N. C. R. Co., 96 N. C. 362, 2 S. B. 247
1887); Young v. So. Tredegar Iron Co., i Pickle, I89, 2 S. W. 202 (1886);
Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Paine, 29 Gratt. 502 (1877); Shenandoah
Valley R. Co. v. Griffith, 76 Va. 9-3 (1882).
2Continental Nat Bank v. Eliot Natl. Bank, 7 F. 369 (1881) ; Scott v.
Bank, 2r Blatchf. 203, 15 F. 494 (1883) ; Hazard v. National Bxch. Bank,
26 F. 94 (1886); Manus v. Brookville Nat. Bank, 73 Ind. 243 (1881) ;
Thurber v. Crump, 86 Ky. 4o8 (1887), semble; Kentucky Nat. Bank v.
Avery, (Ky. C. C.) 12 Nat Corp. Report. I1 (1896); Smith v. Crescent
City Co., 30 La. Ann. 1378 (1878) ; Friedlander v. Slaughterhouse Co.,
31 La. Ann. 523 (1879) ; Pitot v. Johnson, 33 La. Ann. 1286 (i88i) ; Kern
v. Day, 45 La. Ann. 71, 12 S. 6 (1893); Boston Music Hall Ass'n v. Cory,
129 Mass. 435 (i88o); Andrews v. Worcester R. R. Co., 159 Mass. 64, 33
N. B. 1109 (1893) ; Lund v. Wheaton Roller Mill Co., 50 Minn. 36, 52 N.
W. 268 (1892); Broadway Bank v. McElrath, 13 N. J. Eq. 24 (i86o);
De Comean v. Guild Farm Oil Co., 3 Daly, 218 (1870) ; Smith v. American
Coal Co., 7 Lans. 317 (1873) ; Dunn v. Star Ins. Co., (N. Y. Supreme
THE COMPULSORY DUPLICATION OF STOCK CERTIFICATES. 87
transferee who has not given value ;' it simply recognizes the
rights of purchasers as superior to those of creditors and other
persons claiming under the seizure. The preference of pur-
chasers over creditors seems in accordance with enlightened
public policy, yet wherever this rule holds good the corporation
runs the risk of incurring liability in consequence of a duplica-
tion of certificates; for if it has no notice of the prior assign-
ment of the stock by the registered owner, it may be compelled
to issue a new certificate to the party claiming under the
seizure, thereby becoming liable in damages to the assignee of
the original certificate.
(c.) In the following cases the rights of the party claiming
under the seizure have been held superior to those of an
assignee of the certificate claiming by a transfer before the
seizure This rule protects the corporation in issuing a new
certificate, but bears harshly on the bonafide purchaser of the
original certificate. The rule seems to rest on statutes giving
creditors greater rights than purchasers for value. A pur-
chaser for value of the legal title is bound in equity by notice
of a prior equifable assignment, but under this rule a creditor
is not.
(d.) In many cases the rights of the different claimants of
the stock are made to depend upon the question of notice to
the party claiming under the seizure. In the following cases
the rights of the party claiming under the seizure without
Ct.,) ig N. Y. Weekly Digest, 531 (1884) ; Weller v. J. B. Pace Tobacco
Co., 2 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1888); Morehead v. Western N. C. R. Co., 96
N. C. 362, 2 S. E. 247 (1887) ; Norton v. Norton, 43 Ohio St. 5o9, 3 N.
. 348 (z885); Haldeman v. Hillsborough, etc-, R. Co., 2 Handy, ioi
(1855) ; United States v.Vaughan, 3 Binney, 394 (1811) ; Commonwealth
v. Watmough, 6 Whart 117 (1840), semble; Finney's Apal 59 Pa. St.
398 (1868); Cornick, v. Richards, 3 Lea, i (1879), sem6/e; Seligson v.
Brown, 61 Tex. 114 (1884); Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Paine, 29 Gratt.
502 (1877) ; and see, Gill v. Continental Gas Co., L. R. 7 Bx. 332 (1872);
Gray v. Stone, (1893) W. N. r33.
3 Bidstrup v. Thompson, 45 F. 452 (1891 ) ; Cornick v. Richards, 3 Lea,
1 (1879).
4 Coleman v. Spencer, 5 Blackf. 197 (1839) ; Fiske v. Carr, 20 Me. 301
(1841); Skowhegan Bank v. Cutler, 49 Me. 315 (i86o) ; Fisher v. Essex
Bank, 5 Gray, 373 (I855) ; Boyd v. Rockport Mills, 7 Gray, 4o6 (1856);
Blanchard v. Dedham Gas Light Co., 12 Gray, 213 (1858) ; Rock v.
Nichols, 3 Allen, 342 (1862) ; Newell v. Williston, 138 Mass. 240 (1885) ;
Application of Murphy, Si Wis. 519 (1881); and see Weston v. Bear
River Co., 5 Cal. 186 (1855), where the same rule was laid down, but
modified on rehearing in 6 Cal. 425.
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notice of a prior assignment have been held superior to those
of the party claiming under such assignment.'
(e.) In the following cases the party claiming under the
seizure had notice of the prior transfer, and his rights were
therefore held inferior to those of the prior transferee.'
(f) In those cases where notice of the prior transfer is held
to determine the rights of the party claiming under the
seizure, there is a diversity of opinion as to when such notice
is material. Some courts hold that notice at any time before
the sale under the seizure binds the purchaser,' while others
hold that notice after the seizure is of no consequence.
4
(g.) When the righls of the party claiming under the seiz-
ure are made dependent on his having no notice of a prior
transfer, as in the cases under (d), (e) and (f), it is clear that
the protection of the corporation from liability to the holder
of the original certificate in consequence of its issue of a new
one is entirely inadequate. Such protection depends upon a
fact which the corporation has no means of determining, viz.:
notice to one party of the rights of the other.
(h.) Where the rights of the assignee of the certificate are
held superior to those of a party claiming under a subsequent
I Dittey v. First Nat. Bank, 20 South. R. 476 (1896); Naglee z.
Pacific Wharf Co., 20 Cal. 529 (1862) ; Farmers' Nat. Gold Bank v. Wil-
son, 58 Cal. 6oo (I88); Northrop v. Newtown Turnpike Co., 3 Conn.
544 (1820) ; Trimble v. Vandegrift, 7 Houst. 451, 32 A. 632 (1887) ; Peo-
ple'srBank v. Gridley, 9i Ill. 457 (1879); People v. Goss Mfg'.Co., 99
11l. 355 (188) ; Fort Madison Lumber Co. v. Batavian Bank, 71 Ia. 270,
32 N. W. 336 (887) ; Pinkerton v. R. Co.,42 N. H. 424 (x861); Butirick
v. Nashua & Lowell R. R., 62 N. H. 413 (1882) ; Sabin v. Bank of
Woodstock, 21 Vt- 353 (1849), semble; andsee, Parker v. Sun Ins. Co., 42
La. Ann. 1172, 8 S. 618 (i89o).
2 Black v. Zacharie, 3 How. 482 (1845) ; Bridgewater Iron Co. v. Liss-
berger, 116 U. S. 8 (1885) ; Dittey v. First Nat. Bank, 20 South. R. 476
(1896) ; Weston '. Bear River Co., 6 Cal. 425 (1856) ; People v. Elmore,
35 Cal. 653 (1868); Farmers' Nat Gold Bank v. Wilson, 58 Cal. 6oo
1881); Blakeman v. Puget Sound Iron Co., 72 Cal. 321, 13 P. 872
1887) ; Plymouth Bank v. Norfolk Bank, 20 Pick. 454 (283o) ; Dickinson
v. Central Nat. Bank, 229 Mass. 279 (1879) ; Newberry v. Detroit Mfg.
Co., 17 Mich. 141 (1868) ; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Richards, 6 Mo. App.
454 (2877); affirmed 74 Mo. 77; Scripture v. Soapstone Co., So N. H. 571
(1871 ) ; Rogers v. N. J. Ins. Co., 8 N. J. Eq. 267 (1849) ; Cheever v.
Meyer, 52 Vt. 66,(1879) ; Van Cise v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 4 Dak. 485,
33 N. W. 897 (1887).
3 Wilson v, St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., io8 Mo. 588, 18 S. W. 286 (289i).
'Jones v. Latham, 70 Ala. 264 (288) ; Central Nat. Bank v. Williston,
138 Mass. 244 (1885).
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seizure, such assignee may lose his rights, in some jurisdic-
tions, at least, by failure to take steps to protect himself. In
Friedlander v. Slaughterhouse Co.,' the transferee before levy
had notice of the execution sale. The purchaser at the
execution sale obtained a decree against the corporation
requiring the issue of a new certificate to him. The cor-
poration appealed from the decree, but the transferee of the
original certificate took no steps to protect his rights, and the
decree against the, corporation was affirmed. It was held
that the transferee of the certificate had lost his right of action
against the corporation by his own neglect.
In Noble v. Turner,2 the transferee of the certificate brought
a bill to compel the transfer of the stock to him. The bill
was dismissed because the stock had been sold seven years
before upon execution against the registered owner, and the
complainant was, therefore, held guilty of laches.
In Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Robbins,3 however, it was held
that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor
of the corporation and against the transferee of the certificate
until the corporation actually refuses to recognize the transfer,
or the transferee has notice that the stock has been transferred
to other parties, and this seems the more reasonable rule.
In some States, as in Alabama,4 the transfer must be recorded
within a certain time in order to be good against a creditor
without notice. In Colorado the transfer must be recorded
within sixty days, or it will not be good even against a
creditor with notice,5 unless the transferee has done all in his
power to procure registration.
6
Inasmuch as the corporation has no means of determining
whether the transferee has slept on his rights or not, such
rules afford it no adequate protection.
131 La. Ann. 523 (1879).
269 Md. 519, 16 A. 124 (1888).
'35 Ohio St. 483 (i88o).
4 Berney Nat. Bank v. Pinckard, 87 Ala. 577, 6 S. 364 (1889) ; White v.
Rankin, go Ala. 541, 8 S. II8 (189o); Abels v. Planters' Ins. Co., 92 Ala.
382, 9 S. 423 (189r)-
5 Conway v. John, 14 Col. 30, 23 P. 170 (I8go) - 'irst Nat. Bank v.
Hastings, 7 Col. App. 129, 42 P. 691 (1895).
6 Weber v. Bullock, 19 Col. 214, 35 P. 163 (,894).
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(i.) In some States an equitable interest in stock may be
seized.' In Rhode Island it seems that the rights of the pur-
chaser at judicial sale of such equitable interest are regarded
as superior to those of a subsequent transferee of the certificate,
2
which is an exception to the general rule that purchase of the
legal title for value and without notice cuts off equities. The
corporation is protected in such cases, however, because the
purchaser of the equitable interest thus seized cannot demand
a certificate of stock?
'(j.) In Rhode Island the officer's deed to the purchaser of
stock at an execution sale is held to vest the title to thestockin
the purchaser.4 The corporation is bound to record the deed,
but is not obliged to issue a new certificate of stock.5 This
rule seems decidedly unsatisfactory. On the one hand, the
execution purchaser is left without any certificate for his stock,
the transfer of which is thereby rendered more difficult; while,
on the other hand, it is not clear that the corporation is pro-
tected from liability to a transferee of the certificate claiming
by assignment before the seizure.
(k.) By reason of the doctrine of relation, a seizure of the
stock may operate to defeat a prior transfer of the certificate.
In Memphis Appeal Co. v. Pike,6 an execution levied in July
was held superior to a transfer in June, because the levy
related back to April Ist, the date of the execution.
(I.) The results of the foregoing decisions with reference to,
the liability of the corporation for issuing a duplicate certifi-
cate may be summed up briefly. The only doctrine which
gives absolute protection to the corporation against liability to
the holder of the original certificate is that stated in (c). Only
where that doctrine prevails is the right of the holder of the
new certificate indisputably superior to that of the holder of
I Foster v. Potter, 37 Mo. 526 (1866) ; National Bank of New London v.
Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 21 Ohio St. 221 (1871) ; Beckwith v. Burroughs,
14 R. I. 366 (1884).
2 Beckwith v. Burroughs, su/ra.
3 National Bank of New London v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., sup ra.
4 Lippitt v. American Wood Paper Co., 14 R. I. 3O (1883) ; Beckwith.
v. Burroughs, i4 R. I. 366 (1884).
5Beckwith v. Burroughs, sufira.
69 Heisk. 697 (1872).
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the old. In all other cases the relative rights of the two
claimants to the stock are made to depend upon some fact
which the corporation has no adequate means of determining.
The important fact may be the priority of the transfer over
the seizure, or notice to the creditor of the transferee's rights,
or laches on the part of the transferee ; but in any case the
fact is one as to the existence of which the corporation must
decide at its peril. Now rule (c) bears so harshly on innocent
purchasers that the tendency both of legislation and of judi-
cial construction is to reduce its application to a minimum,
thus diminishing the protection to the corporation in case of
the duplication of certificates. The injustice to the corpora-
tion in compelling it to assume the risk of liability to the
transferee of a certificate of stock by requiring it to issue a
new certificate to a person claiming under a seizure of the
stock is clear. The injustice, however, is the creation of sta-
tute, and it is to legislation, therefore, that we must look for a
remedy which the courts have no power to give.
(m.) What remedy, then, is to be sought for this unfortu-
nate condition of affairs? The fate which has overtaken so
many mighty schemes of law. reform ought to inspire diffi-
dence in any one who is minded to improve the law; yet to
criticize the law without offering any suggestions for its better-
ment is permissible only to a layman. The suggestion that I
would venture, with all deference, to make is a simple, yet a
radical one.
Had the decisions of Lord Hardwicke governed his suc-
cessors, and had the opinions of Chancellor Kent controlled
American courts of equity, much of the difficulty that has arisen
in regard to the transfer of stock might have been avoided.'
It is clear that a debtor's choses in action ought to be subject
to the claims of his creditors; but the common law had no
means of reaching choses in action. It is hard to conceive of
a clearer case for the application of equitable relief than this,
yet such relief has been generally denied. The injustice of
courts of equity in refusing such relief has induced the legis-
lature to provide statutory remedies for the creditor. Unfor-
I Bigelow on Fraud, II. 70-76.
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tunately, the statutory remedies have been processes like
attachment and execution which are adapted in their nature
only to the seizure of corporeal property. In the case of
stock the injustice wrought by these statutory remedies has
been pointed out. The most satisfactory method for protect-
ing the creditor, the purchaser, and the corporation seems to
be this. Abolish all seizure of stock by process in rem, and
remit the creditor to a court of equity for relief. If the regis-
tered owner of stock is the real owner, the creditor would
then reach the stock by a creditor's bill. The decree would
require the defendant to transfer the certificates to the creditor,
or to a receiver who should offer them for sale. Duplication
of certificates in consequence of our present legislation
requiring the issue of new certificates without the cancellation
of the old would then cease. Such duplication is clearly
recognized by the courts as an injustice to the corporation,
and they will not compel it in the absence of statute.'
II. SEIZURE OF STOCK CERTIFICATES.
One word must be said in regard to the second theory con-
cerning the seizure of stock, that stock may be seized by
seizing the certificates. It is generally held that stock can be
seized only at the domicile of the corporation, and that the
seizure of the certificates cannot affect the title to the stock 2
In Louisiana, however, stock may be seized either in the
usual manner, by notifying the corporation, or by seizing
the certificates.3 And in Minnesota the garnishment statutes
of that State have recently been held to apply to certificates of
stock in foreign corporations. In Puget Sound National Bank
v. Mather,4 the garnishee held certificates of stock in a Wash-
'Joslyn v. St. Paul Distilling Co., 44 Minn. 183, 46 N. W. 337 (1890);
Bean v. American Loan & T. Co., 122 N. Y. 622,26 N. B. ii (I89o).
2Younkin v. Collier, 47 F. 571 (1891); Winslow v. Fletcher, 53
Conn. 390, 4 A. 250 (1886) ; Reid Ice Cream Co. v. Stephens, 62 Ill. App.
334 (1895); Smith v. Downey, 8 Ind. App. 179, 34 N. R. 823 (1893);
Armour Bros. Packing Co. v. St. Louis Nat. Bank, 113 Mo. 12, 20 S. W.
69o (1892) ; Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 592 (1883) ; Chrlstmas v.
Biddle, 13 Pa. St. 223 (1850) ; Ireland v. GlobeMilling Co., (R. I.) 32 A.
921 (1895) ; Moore v. Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 375 (1875) ; Young v. So.
Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 2 S. W. 202 (1886).
8 Harris v. Bank of Mobile, 5 La. Ann. 539 (185o).
4 6o Minn. 362, 62 N. W. 396 (1895).
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ington corporation, which had been pledged to it by the prin-
cipal defendants as collateral security for a debt. The court
held that the garnishment was proper; that the certificates
were property of the defendants in the hands of the garnishee,
and that they could be seized accordingly. The court further
intimates that such certificates could be seized on attachment
or execution. If this decision could stand, the difficulties
arising from the duplication of stock certificates might be
avoided. The sheriff could seize the certificates of stock, sell
them on execution, and transfer them to the purchaser at
the execution sale, who would then surrender them to the
corporation and receive new ones. But the decision of the
Minnesota court can no more affect the title to stock in a
Washington corporation than it could affect the title to land
in Washington. Stock in a Minnesota corporation may be
seized in Minnesota by seizing the certificates; stock in a
Louisiana corporation may be seized in Louisiana in the same
way; over such property the legislature and the courts of the
State have control. But the judgment of a court of one State
cannot affect the title to property in another State; and it is
too well settled to admit of argument that the situs of the
stock for purposes of seizure is the domicile of the corpora-
tion. The owner of the stock in the Minnesota case would
simply be in the position of a man whose certificates were lost
or stolen. He would remain the owner of the stock, and
should be entitled to a new certificate therefor upon proper
terms.
§ 3. COMPULSORY DUPLICATION OF CERTIFICATES IN CON-
SEQUENCE OF SUPPOSED Loss OR DESTRUCTION OF ORIGINALS.
Where a certificate of stock has been lost or destroyed, it is
generally held that the corporation must issue a duplicate cer-
tificate. Statutes exist in some jurisdictions authorizing the
courts to compel the issue of duplicate certificates in such
cases. On general principles, however, it seems that a court
of equity has jurisdiction to decree that a duplicate certificate
shall be issued in such cases.' The question then arises as to
'IKinnan v. Forty-second St. R. Co., 14o N. Y. 183, 35 N. B. 408
(1893); Galveston City Co. v. Sibley, 56 Tex. 269 (1882).
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the effect of the original certificate, which may be still out-
standing. Suppose that the registered owner of stock by
alleging that he has lost his certificate procures a duplicate,
and then transfers the two certificates to different purchasers
for value and without notice? It seems that the prior trans-
feree would have the prior equitable right, but that if either
transferee acquired the legal title to the stock in consequence
of the recognition of his transfer by the corporation, his title
would not be disturbed. What then is the right of the inno-
cent purchaser of the other certificate ? Clearly he has a
right of action against the corporation in accordance with the
general principles stated in § I.' It follows that a bond of
indemnity should always be required by the corporation of the
person who seeks to compel the issue of a duplicate certificate
in consequence of the alleged loss or destruction of the original.
Where the court acts in the exercise of its general equity juris-
diction this bond is generally, and should be always required.2
In England the custom seems to be to require indemnity only
in the absence of satisfactory proof of loss.3 In New York, in
addition to the equitable remedy, the statute of 1873, c. 151,
provides a summary remedy for the stockholder, but requires
indemnity. In Minnesota the Act of 1893, c. 45, requires
indemnity; but in case the certificate has not been heard of for
seven years no indemnity need be given.' In Louisiana no
indemnity is required.' In Missouri it has been held, not by
the court of last resort, that even the giving of indemnity will
not entitle the stockholder to a new certificate in regular form,
IKeller v. Eureka Brick Co., 43 Mo. App. 84 (189o) ; Brisbane v. Del-
aware, L. & W. R. Co., 94 N. Y. 204 (1883) ; Cleveland & M. R. Co. v.
Robbins, 35 Ohio St. 483 (i88o); Galveston City Co. v. Sibley, supra;
Greenleaf v. Ludington, 15 Wis. 558 (1862). The dictum to the contrary
in Guilford v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, 61 N. W. 324 (1894)
is unsound and opposed to the more reasonable view taken by the same
court in Joslyn v. Distilling Co., 44 Minn. 186, 46 N. W. 377 (189o).
2 Guilford v. Western Union Tel. Co., 43 Minn. 434, 46 'N. V. 70
(189o) ; Galveston City Co. v. Sibley, 56 Tex. 269 (1882) ; where no new
certificate was issued, but the cause was kept standing on the docket for
the protection of the corporation.
3 See Soci~t6 de Paris v. Walker, i1 A. C. 20 (1886) ; London v. Prov.
Tel. Co., L. R. 9 Eq. 653 (1870).
4 Guilford v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, 61 N. W. 324
(1894).
3 Phillips v. New Orleans Gas Light Co., 25 La. Ann. 413 (1873).
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but that the new certificate must be marked "duplicate " and
refer to the decree authorizing it.'
Although a bond of indemnity offers some protection to
the corporation issuing a duplicate certificate in place of one
alleged to be lost, such protection is not always required, and
may prove inadequate. How then shall the corporation be
pretected and the rights of the stockholder who has lost his
certificate be preserved at the same time? The attempted
solutions of this problem do not seem to have been very suc-
cessful. If a new certificate is issued in the form prescribed
by the Missouri court, it will be unmarketable. The Supreme
Courts of Minnesota and Louisiana have met the difficulty by
assuming that a transferee of the original certificate could
acquire no rights against the corporation,2 an assumption
manifestly unsound. In New York the Act of 1873, C. 151,
provides that when a new certificate is issued, and a bond of
indemnity given, the holder of the original certificate shall
have no further claim against the corporation, but shall be
remitted to the bond of indemnity. This provision has' been
attacked by Mr. Thompson' as unconstitutional, involving
the taking of property without due process of law. The criti-
cism seems just. If A. is the registered owner of stock, and
B. buys his certificate, B. acquires a right to demand a transfer
of the stock on the books of the corporation. This is a right
of property, a chose in action, and cannot be taken from B.
by a proceeding to which he is not a party.
There seems to be only one way to protect both the cor-
poration and the stockholder who has lost his certificate. An
act might be passed providing for an equitable proceeding in
the nature of a bill.to quiet title. A bill of this kind, brought
by the registered owner against the corporation and the
"unknown claimants" to the stock, would enable the court
to enter a decree barring the rights of any transferee of the
original certificate, and thus protecting the corporation.
Northwestern University Law School, Edward Avery Harriman.
Chicago, February I, 2897.
1 Keller v. Eureka Brick Co., 43 Mo. App. 84 (189o).
2 Guilford v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, 6I N. W. 324 (1894);
Phillips v. New Orleans Gas Light Co., 25 La. Ann. 413 (1873).
3 Corporations, J 2524.
